Abstract. We propose a new computational complexity assumption from bilinear map, based on which we construct Verifier-Local Revocation group signatures with shorter lengths than previous ones.
Introduction
Group signature [1] is motivated by enabling members of a group to sign on behalf of the group without leaking their own identities, and at the same time the signer's identity can be discovered by the group manager (GM) when a dispute occurs.
In brief, a group signature scheme is a signature scheme that has multiple secret keys corresponding to a single public key. A group signature should at least include the following five algorithms: Setup, Join, GSig, GVer and Open. Setup is executed by the group manager (GM); Join is an interactive protocol between a group member and GM or a separate issuing authority (IA); GSig is an algorithm run by any group member; any one can execute GVer to check the validity of a given group signature; Open is used by GM or a separate opening authority (OA) to find the identity of the signer given a group signature.
Various applications have been found for group signature schemes, such as anonymous authentication, internet voting and bidding. But wide implementation of group signatures in the real world has been prevented because of some factors, among which is efficient membership revocation as pointed out in [2] .
Nontrivial resolutions to membership revocation have been proposed with regard to specific group signature schemes. The resolutions can be classified into two categories. One is based on witness [3] [4] [5] , another is based on revocation list (RL) [6, 7] . Resolutions based on witness is advantageous over the latter in that growing revocation lists are not needed to maintain, but in some applications RL based revocations are more suitable because they admit shorter signature size [8] .
RL Based Revocation. In this category, a natural resolution is to let GM issue a revocation list of identities (public membership keys) RL, any group member proves in a zero-knowledge way that his identity hidden in the group signature is not equal to any one in RL [6] . The drawback is that signature size is linearly dependent on the size of RL. [7] improved the above approach resulting in a scheme that signature size and computation are constant while the complexity of GVer is linearly dependent on the size of RL. In this resolution, GM publishes a RL which includes V i = f (pcert i ), i.e., evaluations of one way function f on partial certificate information pcert i which is unique to each group member. In signing a message, member i includes a random R, and T = f (V i , R) (f is another one way function which may equal f ) in the group signature. Verifiers check if T = f (V i , R) by trying every V i in the current RL.
The idea of [7] is followed by [8, 9] etc., and is named verifier-local revocation (VLR) and formalized in [8] . Nakanishi et. al. [9] , however, pointed out previous VLR schemes have a drawback of backward linkability, and proposed another VLR scheme based on [8] with the feature of backward unlinkability (BU), i.e., group signatures generated by the same group member is unlinkable except himself and GM, even after this member has been revoked (his/her revocation token is published).
Contributions. We propose a new computational complexity assumption from bilinear map, and a new standard signature, two new verifier-local revocation group signature, one without backward unlinkability, another with backward unlinkability, based on our assumption. The proposed group signature schemes are more efficient both in signature length and signature generation/verification than previous ones.
Organization. Our new complexity assumption and the new standard signature are described in Section 3. The proposed new group signatures from bilinear map are presented in Section 5, with corresponding security proofs provided in Appendixes.
Preliminaries
Suppose that G 1 = g , G 2 = g and G 3 are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, there exists an efficient non-degenerate bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 2 →G 3 , i.e., e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab for any u ∈ G 1 , v ∈ G 2 , a, b ∈ Z p , and e(g,g) = 1.
Definition 1 (LRSW Assumption [10] 
where Q is the set of queries that A has made to O x,y (.).
Definition 2 (DDH)
In the bilinear groups G 1 , G 2 defined above, for any PPT bounded probabilistic algorithm A, the following probability is negligible: [11] , a noninteractive version of the above proof of knowledge transformed in Fiat-Shamir method [12] .
Because the easiness of transformation between PK and SK, they might be mentioned interchangeably in the sequel. We let VSK denote the corresponding verification of SK.
x R ← − S denotes x is chosen uniformly at random from the set S. x $ ← − A(., ., .) denotes x is generated from executing algorithm A where random variables are chosen uniformly at random.
k denote a k tuple from G and Z * p respectively. |M | denotes the binary length of string M , |S| denotes the number of elements in the set S.
A New Complexity Assumption
The idea of Assumption 1 comes from an effort to reduce the items in LRSW Assumption from three to two, so that the signature size based on the assumption will be shortened. After an analysis of all possible (g r , g f (r,x,y,m) ), where f (.) = c 0 rx + c 1 ry + c 2 xy, c i ∈ {0, 1, m} for i = 0, 1, 2, we found it seems unforgeable when (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ {(1, m, 1), (m, 1, m)}, and actually they are interchangeable to each other. Assumption 1 (Our New Assumption) Suppose G 1 , G 2 , G 3 are defined as in Section 2 and generated by a setup algorithm. Let 
. The proof (see Appendix A) follows similar proofs in [13, 14] . The relationship among Assumption 1, LRSW, and Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [14] are still not clear. A new standard signature scheme can be obtained based on this assumption.
Scheme 1 Let G 1 , G 2 , G 3 and bilinear map e be the same as described in Section 2 and Assumption 1. 
Definition of Verifier-Local Revocation Group Signature
We provide a variant definition of VLR group signature from [8, 9] as follows. , j, m) , where gsk i is the group signing key of a member in the group, returns σ as a group signature on m at time period j. -GVer: a deterministic algorithm on input (gpk, RL j , j, m, σ), where σ is purported to be a group signature on m at time period j when the revocation list is RL j , returns 1 to accept the group signature as valid or 0 to deny the group signature as invalid. -Open: on input a message-signature pair (m, j, σ), Reg, returns (i, π) indicating i is the purported identity of the group member who signed the signature when i > 0, or none of the members has generated σ when i = 0, and π is a proof of this claim. -Judge: on input of (gpk, RL j , j, m, σ, i, π, pk i ), return 1 to accept the claim of π, or 0 to deny the claim. -If j is constant, GS is a VLR group signature w/o backward unlinkability, otherwise it is a VLR scheme with backward unlinkability.
In the following paragraphs, we investigate a formal adversary model of VLR group signature based on [15, 8, 9] . Firstly we define the oracles similar to [15] . It is assumed that several global variables are maintained by the oracles: HU , a set of honest users; CU , a set of corrupted users; GSet, a set of message signature pairs; and Chlist, a list of challenged message signature pairs. Note that not all the oracles will be available to adversaries in defining a certain security feature.
AddU (i): If i ∈ HU ∪ CU , the oracle returns ⊥, else adds i to HU , executes algorithm Join.
CrptU (i, pk): If i ∈ HU ∪ CU , the oracle returns ⊥, else sets pk i = pk, CU ← CU ∪ {i}, and awaits an oracle query to SndT oI. 
GSig(i,j,m): If i /
∈ HU , the oracle returns ⊥, else returns a group signature σ on m by user i at time period CrptIA: The oracle returns the secret key ik of IA.
CrptOA: The oracle returns the registration table Reg.
We say an oracle is over another oracle if availability of the oracle implies functions of another oracle. For example, WReg is over RReg since the adversary can try to remember everything it has written to Reg; CrptIA is over CrptU, SndToI since knowledge of ik enables the adversary to act as the two oracles itself; CrptIA is also over CrptOA; CrptOA is over Open and RReg since OA has access to Reg. Note that we do not let CrptIA over WReg so as to provide flexibility when accesses to the database Reg are granted by an independent DBA (database administrator).
Correctness. For any adversary that is not computationally restricted, a group signature generated by an honest group member is always valid; algorithm Open will always correctly identify the signer given the above group signature; the output of Open will always be accepted by algorithm Judge.
Selfless-anonymity. This concept is named in [8] . Imagine a PPT adversary A, whose goal is to distinguish the signer of a group signature
Naturally the adversary A might want to get the group signing keys of some other honest group members except i 0 , i 1 (through oracle USK ); it might want to obtain some group signatures signed by i 0 , i 1 at the time period J(through oracle GSig); it might want to see some outputs of OA (through oracle Open except (J, m, σ)); it might also try to corrupt some group members by running Join with IA (through oracles CrptU and SndToI ); it might observe the communication of some honest members joining in (through SndToU if IA is corrupted, not available otherwise); it might want to write to Reg (through oracles WReg); it might want to revoke some honest group members except i 0 , i 1 . Obviously A should not be allowed to corrupt OA and IA and request to RReg, and it is also forbidden from requesting revocation token of i 0 , i 1 before the challenged time period J (including J).
A VLR group signature GS is selfless-anonymous if the probability for any PPT adversary to win is negligible, i.e., the value of Adv anon GS,A defined below is negligible.
where experiments Exp Table 1 . Traceability. Imagine a PPT adversary A, whose goal is to produce a valid group signature (m, σ) at time period j and a corresponding revocation list RL j , the output of Open points to a non-existent and unrevoked member or an existing corrupted member but can not pass Judge.
Naturally the adversary A might corrupt some group members by running Join with IA (through oracles CrptU and SndToI ); it might want to see some outputs of OA (through oracle Open); it might want to read from (through oracles RReg); or A might corrupt OA directly (through oracle CrptOA). Obviously A should not be allowed to corrupt IA and query WReg. Note that A might not bother to query about honest group members for they are of little help for it.
A VLR group signature GS is traceable if the probability for any PPT adversary to win is negligible, i.e., the value of Adv Table 2 . Non-frameability. Imagine a PPT adversary A, whose goal is to produce a valid group signature (m, σ) at time period j and a corresponding revocation list RL j , the output of Open points to an existing unrevoked honest member i h and the result passes Judge.
Naturally the adversary A might want to get the group signing keys of some group members (through oracle U SK); it might want to obtain some group signatures signed by some honest group members (through oracle GSig); it might want to see some outputs of OA (through oracle Open); it might also try to corrupt some group members by running Join with IA (through oracles CrptU and SndToI ); it might observe the communication of some honest members joining in (through SndToU if CrptIA is queried, not available otherwise); it might wait until more group members has joined in (through AddU ); it might want to write to or read from Reg (through oracles WReg, RReg); or A might corrupt OA or IA directly (through oracle CrptOA and CrptIA). Obviously A should not be allowed to query
A VLR group signature GS is non-frameable if the probability for any PPT adversary to win is negligible, i.e., the value of Adv nf GS,A defined below is negligible.
Adv Table 3 after taking consideration of "over" relationship between oralces.
Else if i ∈ HU and Judge (gpk, RLj, j, m, σ, i, π, pki) = 1 and (i, j, m, .) / ∈ GSet, return 1, else return 0. Table 3 . Non-frameability.
Definition 4 A VLR group signature scheme is secure if it is selfless-anonymous, traceable and non-frameable.

VLR Group Signature with Backward Unlinkability
The following model and definitions conform to [9] .
Definition 5 (BU-VLR group signature) A BU-VLR group signature, i.e., a group signature scheme with verifier-local revocation and backward unlinkability simultaneously consists of the following algorithms. We suppose the maximum number of group members is n and the total time period is T .
-KGen(n, T ): A probabilistic algorithm to generate group public key gpk, secret key gsk i for each group member i ∈ [1, n] , and revocation tokens grt ij for each member i at time period j. -GSig(gpk, j, gsk i , m): A probabilistic algorithm that produces a signature σ on message m ∈ {0, 1} * at time period j by group member i who possesses the secret key gsk i .
-Revoke(RL j , grt ij ): If i is to be revoked for the time period j, the group manager adds grt ij to the revocation list of time period j, i.e., KGen corresponds to algorithms Setup and Join. Open is omitted since GM can run GVer against unpublished revocation tokens to find a group member match.
Definition 6 (Correctness)
Definition 7 (BU-Anonymity) A BU-VLR group signature has BU-anonymity if any PPT bounded probabilistic adversary A only has probability of 1 2 + ( is negligible), i.e., with advantage of , to win in the following game.
-Setup: An instance of the BU-VLR group signature is established and gpk, gsk, grt are generated by a challenger, A is given only gpk. -Queries:
• Signing queries: A is allowed to request a signature on any message m for any group member i at time period j.
• Corruption: A is allowed to request the secret key of any group member i, i.e., gsk i .
• Revocation: A is allowed to request the revocation token of any group member i at any time period j, i.e., grt ij . 
Definition 8 (Traceability)
A BU-VLR group signature has traceability if any PPT bounded probabilistic adversary A only has negligible probability to win in the following game.
-Setup: An instance of the BU-VLR group signature is established and gpk, gsk, grt are generated by a challenger, A is given gpk, grt. A set U is initialized empty. -Queries:
• Corruption: A is allowed to request the secret key of any group member i, i.e., gsk i , i is added into U . 
Proposed VLR Group Signature
Brief Idea. Actually a group signature can be viewed as a proof of knowledge of a standard signature signed by an authority ( [11] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [4] , [10] , [20] ), so every standard signature can be employed to construct a group signature scheme [21] , the point is how to obtain an efficient group signature scheme, and not every standard signature will result in efficient construction. Scheme 1, however, has two features that make it a suitable candidate for group signature.
-For any signature (U ,V ) of m, any one can derive a new signature (U ,V ) of the same message:
IA, as the signer of Scheme 1, signs blindly on s i , i.e., outputs (U i , V i ) as a member certificate of i. Group member i firstly generates a proof of knowledge of (s i , U i , V i ), when he is asked to produce a group signature of a message, then randomize his member certificate according to the first feature, now what left is to prove his knowledge of s i , which has standard and efficient resolution already [22] .
The brief idea of Scheme 3 follows the above idea. Additionally a revocation tag
as well as a proof of knowledge of (s i , δ) is appended to the end of a group signature, where h j is chosen at the beginning of time period j by the revocation authority (IA or OA), and published along with the revocation list at that time RL j . The method is the same of [9] , but our resulted scheme is about 23% shorter in signature length.
The Scheme without Backward Unlinkability
Scheme 2 utilizes a trusted third party TP in case OA might be corrupted. If OA is fully trusted, then the scheme can be simplified by eliminating TP and signature of i on A i , without invalidating corresponding proofs. Note that we omit the index of time period in the following description because it is a VLR scheme without backward unlinkability.
Scheme 2 (Our Proposal w/o BU) Let G 1 , G 2 , G 3 and bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 2 →G 3 be defined as in Section 2.
-Setup: Group secret key is (x, y)
registration table Reg is maintained and initialized empty.
A signature scheme S is selected, which is similar to the scheme in [23] :
p as a secret key, set pk = g z ∈ G 1 as a public key. S.Sign: To sign a message m ∈ G 2 , calculate σ = m z as the signature.
S.Verify: To verify a given message-signature pair (m, σ), check if e(g, σ)=e(pk, m).
A third trusted party TP is also selected. Each user i has to generate his public key pk i and secret key sk i = z i of S, and register them to TP before joining in the group. TP will publish the users' public key and corresponding identity i. -Join: A user i interacts with IA to obtain his certificate in a private channel as follows:
along with a proof of knowledge ofs i to IA.
User ← IA: IA verifies that the proof of knowledge is correct, then selects r 1 
It can be proved sound and of honest verifier zero-knowledge exactly as in [22, 20, 26] -Open: The identity of the signer of a given group signature (m, U , V , τ ) can be opened as follows.
Check if e(V ,g) = e(U , XA i )e(X, Y ) for some A i stored in Reg.
If A i satisfies the above equation, generates π, a proof of knowledge of (A i , σ i ), i.e., let
Here pk i is the S public key of the revealed member i, which are bound together with i by TP. The detail of PK 2 is provided in Appendix B. The output of Open is (i, π).
Note that IA can also open a group signature. IA checks if there exists a A i stored in Reg that e(U , XA i ) = e(V /g xy ,g), it retrieves the matching A i and generates π, a proof of knowledge of (xy, A i , σ i ) if that is the case. This method can only be executed by IA knowing x, y, the former method can be done by any opening authority assigned by IA, if only the OA has access to Reg. Thus our scheme has a kind of flexibility.
-Judge: This algorithm judges the correctness of output of Open by checking π. -Revoke: To revoke a group member i, IA or OA just publishes the corresponding A i in RL.
The security results of Scheme 2 are as follows.
Theorem 2 (Traceability). Scheme 2 is traceable in random oracle model under Assumption 1.
The proof is in Appendix C.
Theorem 3 (Non-frameability). Scheme 2 is non-frameable in random oracle model under Discrete Logarithm assumption in group G 3 which implies Discrete Logarithm is hard in
The proof is standard and similar to those of [26] etc., because a valid group signature of Scheme 2 is in fact a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of s i that e(V ,g) = e(U , X Y si )e(X, Y ), and s i is never exposed to others including IA and OA.
Theorem 4 (Selfless-anonymity). Scheme 2 is selfless-anonymous in random oracle model under DDH assumption in
The theorem is implied by by the following lemma with proof in Appendix D. ), where n is the total number of group members.
Lemma 2. Suppose an adversary
Open with Complexity O(1). An alternative construction of obtaining
Open with complexity independent with size of revocation list is to encrypt Y si using the linear encryption scheme based on Linear Diffie-Hellman Assumption [4] , i.e., select (α, β)
α+β , where u, v, w ∈ G 1 are among the group public keys, and OA owns x 1 , x 2 that w = u x1 = v x2 as secret keys. The group signature by member i is (U i , V i r , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) plus a proof of knowledge of (α, β, s i , r) accordingly. The resulted signature length is 1704 bits, equal to [4] .
The Scheme with Backward Unlinkability
Our proposal Scheme 2 can be extended to include backward unlinkability in the same method as in [9] , see the following description.
Scheme 3 (Our Proposal w/ BU) Let G 1 , G 2 , G 3 and bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 2 →G 3 be defined as in Section 2.
-Setup: Same as Scheme 2, except that h is missing from the group public key.
-Join: Same as Scheme 2.
-GSig: Member i (in possession of certificate (U i , V i ) and secret key s i ) generates a group signature σ of message m at time period j as follows.
The group signature of m signed by i at time period j is σ = (U , V , S, T, τ ).
-GVer: A verifier does the following checks, given a group signature σ = (U , V , S, T, τ ) on m at time period j:
Firstly, check the validity of τ =(s α , s β , s γ , c) by running VSK 2 (τ ), which is also standard, i.e., verify that if The correctness of Scheme 3 is easy to verify. The traceability and nonframeability follow from that of Scheme 2. What remains to analyze is selflessanonymity in the case of backward unlinkability, i.e., BU-anonymity [9] .
Theorem 5. Scheme 3 is selfless-anonymous in random oracle model under DDH assumption in
The theorem is implied by the following lemma (proved in Appendix E). 
Lemma 3. Suppose an adversary
Our scheme has the feature of being BU-enabled and non-frameable at the same time. [9] can also be extended to satisfy the two requirements simultaneously just as how the basic scheme is enhanced with strong exculpability in [4] , at the cost of longer signature length because knowledge of an extra exponent has to be proved.
The Scheme without Random Oracles
Our new assumption 1 can be used to construct an efficient group signature without Random Oracles (RO) following [13] .
Scheme 4 (Our Proposal w/o RO) Let G 1 , G 2 , G 3 and bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 2 →G 3 be defined as in Section 2.
-Setup:
GroupSetup. Group secret key is (x, y)
The group manager or IA also maintain a database Reg. UserKeyGen. Each user selects random sk ∈ Z * p and random h ∈ G 1 , and outputs its public key pk = (h, e(h,g) sk ). -Join: User i holding its secret key sk i and public key pk i = (h i , e(h i ,g) ski ) run interactively with IA. User → IA: User i submits its public key pk i , the user provides a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the corresponding sk i using any extractable proof technique (see [13] for a discussion of such proof techniques). User → IA: User i submits its tracing information Q i =g ski to IA. Let pk i = (p 1 , p 2 ), if e(p 1 , Q i ) = p 2 , and Q i is new in Reg, IA stores Q i in the database Reg; otherwise IA aborts. User → IA: User i sends A = g ski to IA. User ← IA: IA computes f 1 = g r , f 2 = g r(x+my)+xy and sends them to the user. User accepts them if e(f 2 ,g) = e(f 1 , X Y ski )e(X, Y ). At the end of the protocol, the user obtains the following member certificate (f 1 , f 2 ). -GSig: Member i (in possession of certificate (f 1 , f 2 ) and secret key sk i ) generates a group signature σ of message m as follows.
The user re-random its certificate by computing
The user generates a BB signature [14] on v using its secret key sk i , i.e., a 5 =g
The user treats the value v as its one-time signing key and computes a BB signature on m using its secret key v, i.e., a 6 =g 1 v+m . The group signature of m signed by i is σ = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 ).
-GVer: A verifier does the following checks, given a group signature σ = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 ) on m:
Firstly, check that (a 1 , a 2 ) is a valid signature on log a1 a 3 under Scheme 1, i.e., if e(a 2 ,g) = e(a 3 ,XỸ )e(X,Ỹ ) holds. Secondly, check if a 5 is a valid BB signature on log a1 a 4 for public key (a 1 ,g, a 3 ), i.e., if e(a 3 a 4 , a 5 ) = e(a 1 ,g) holds.
In the end, check if a 6 is a valid BB signature on m for public key (a 1 ,g, a 4 ) 
Efficiency Comparison
To implement our schemes, a group where DDH is hard and an efficient bilinear map is defined is required. A natural selection is non-supersingular elliptic curves defined on finite field, with MOV degree, i.e., embedding degree, larger than one, because distortion map which is the only tool solving DDH on an elliptic curve nowadays does not exist in these curves according to [27] , and MNT curves happen to satisfy the requirements and can be constructed systematically [28] . So our schemes are realizable on MNT curves. Scheme of [13] has the same requirement as ours, while schemes of [9, 8] are also realizable on supersingular elliptic curves besides MNT curves.
The following table is a performance comparison of known VLR schemes in signature size, i.e., length of σ in bits, and computations required in algorithms GSig and GVer, i.e., multi-exponentiations (denoted as ME) number in G 1 and bilinear map (denoted as BM) number. Note that computations that permit preprocessing are not counted.
Note that the computation estimations are made according to [8] , i.e., p is about 170 bits, elements of G 1 are 171 bits, and elements of G 3 are 1020 bits, achieving a security level similar to 1024 bits RSA. In case [13] and Scheme 4, elements of G 2 are chosen about 3 times that of G 1 . 
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Consider an algorithm B that interacts with A in the following game. B maintains two lists of pairs
, such that at step τ in the game, we have
, the ξ 1,i , ξ 2,i , ξ 3,i are set to unique random strings in {0, 1} * . We start the game at step τ = 0 with τ 1 = 3, τ 2 = 3, τ 3 = 0, they corresponds to (ξ 1,b ) . We now argue that it is impossible for A to achieve this. F 1,i has the following form according to the description above:
, where k denotes 1≤k≤τv for simplicity.
It follows that
For the above function to be zero for any (x, y, v 1 , ..., v τv ), all the coefficients are to be zero, then (6) .
Thus A's overall success is bounded by the probability that any of the above equation holds. We observe that F 1,i is non-trivial polynomial of degree at most 2, F 2,i at most 1, F 3,i at most 4, the function of (6) at most 3.
For fixed i, j, the first case occur with probability ≤ 2/p, the second case ≤ 1/p, the third case ≤ 4/p. The fourth case happens with probability ≤ 3/p. Summing over all (i, j) pairs in each case, we bound A's overall success probabil-
B Detail of PK 2 in Scheme 2
The detail of the proof of knowledge 
